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Abstract
What can we say about systematic global and broad regional trends in the drivers of income inequality
in countries? In order to address this question, this work takes an integrated approach in that it looks at
a broad set of countries and examines a broad set of determinants. We thus model technological progress,
non-resource trade flows, the education distribution, labor vs. capital income as well as heterogeneity
in public social spending and analyze the relation to three income inequality measures in Advanced and
Developing Economies. Our findings indicate the main factors adding to increasing inequality globally
to be technological progress and trade with high-income countries. Trade with low-income countries,
public spending on health and decreasing shares of people without any formal education, on the other
hand, had significant equalizing effects on the income distribution. The estimated effects of the education
distribution, public education spending and the labor income share are highly region specific and thus
indicate the importance of disentangling global effects.
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1 Introduction
Income inequality has received growing attention in the academia as well as in the popular media, particularly
since national inequality has risen in most parts of the world over the last few decades. This attention has
spawned a number of research studies that attempt to explain this trend. Disentangling income inequality
into its main drivers is a daunting challenge, not only because factors at many scales - global, sub-national
and subgroups within nations - affect national income distributions, but also because a range of different
drivers interact to influence income inequality. Quantitative studies have either focused on specific regions,
due to data availability and reliability especially on OECD economies; or have concentrated on specific
drivers, e.g. education, globalization or labor market institutions. These works often rely on a simplified
representation of control variables, e.g. education measured as average years of schooling. This leaves open
the question of whether one can discern from empirical analysis any robust, systematic global or regional
patterns in the drivers of national income inequality.
In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of income inequality trends, this work takes an
integrated approach in two respects. First, we look at a broad set of countries, including Advanced as well
as Developing Economies, and analyze global and differential broad regional trends. Second, we examine
a broad set of determinants in order to disentangle the concerning effects. We assembled a unique dataset
that combines multiple income inequality indicators, the income Gini coefficient and a ratio of extremes,
with the most recent data on multiple drivers. We give particular attention to modeling the distribution of
educational attainment but also analyze technological progress, as represented by total factor productivity,
trade between high- and low-income countries, the labor income share and heterogeneity in public social
spending, Finally, we use a panel estimation method that controls for country-specific effects and corrects
for error disturbances, and test the robustness of our findings with respect to income inequality measures,
model specifications and regions.
Our findings indicate the main factors adding to increasing inequality globally to be technological progress
and trade with high-income countries. Both market forces contribute to the skill-biasedness of labor demand.
Trade with low-income countries, public spending on health and decreasing shares of people without any
formal education, on the other hand, had significant equalizing effects on the income distribution. The
estimated effects of the education distribution, public education spending and the labor income share are
highly region specific. We are also able to provide supplementary insights into the linkages between drivers
and inequality by analyzing the decile ratio in addition to the Gini coefficient as dependent variable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review extant literature, and describe
how existing knowledge motivates this study. In Section 3, we introduce our income inequality measures
and data sources, including the considerable processing we undertook to reduce measurement error and test
robustness to indicator choice. In Section 4, we describe and justify our covariates. Descriptive trends of
income and education inequality measures are presented in Section 5 while we justify our estimation method
in Section 6. In Section 7, we present and discuss our results, and in Section 8 we draw conclusions and
provide pointers for further work.
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2 What we know: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Fundamentally, the degree of (in)equality in the distribution income in a country is a function of the dis-
tribution of labor and capital and the individual returns to each of these factors. The distribution of labor
income, in turn, depends in part on the market forces of supply and demand. Labor supply is determined
by the composition and size of labor, which is primarily driven by education and demography. In contrast,
demand-side factors primarily include trade and technology. The distribution of capital income is shaped by
historical factors and endowments, but the growing importance of financial markets and global integration
have implications for the distribution of both capital and labor income. Finally, government policies and
institutions can influence all of these factors directly and indirectly.
In the transition from agricultural to industrialized economies, induced by groundbreaking innovations in
electricity and transport, among other things, the demand for skilled workers increased, thereby increasing
manufacturing wages relative to that agricultural labor. By the 1950s, this skill premium started to decrease
as more and more people attained the required skills through formal education. Observing the resulting
decrease in income inequality lead to the famous Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955) that inequality first
increases but after some point decreases in the process of development. In the US and in Europe, com-
puterization and advancements in information and communication technology induced the transition from
industrialized to service sector and knowledge economies in the early 1980s. Technological progress lead, to
some degree, to a replacement of routine manufacturing jobs by machines, made simple jobs more complex
and created new jobs requiring higher skills. Thus, again, high-skilled wages increased relative to low skilled
wages. In a nutshell, if technological progress is skill biased, it increases the relative demand for higher skills,
thereby increasing inequality in the distribution of wages, implying a positive relation between technological
progress and income inequality. Even if technological and sectoral shifts are different, the general direction of
the effect prevails for Advanced and Developing Economies. Acemoglu (2003) provides a theoretical frame-
work which enables to deduce that this relationship holds not only for the US, but also for Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), where technological adoption and imitation is promoted via trade.
The characterization of trade effects has long been dominated by the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and its
corollary, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (SST) (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). The theorem posits that trade
liberalization has an ameliorating effect on income inequality in exporting countries if nations specialize in
goods whose production requires the type of labor they are relatively abundant in. Conversely, imports that
compete with domestic markets increase income inequality by driving down prices and wages in these market
segments. If industrialized economies export capital- and knowledge-intensive while importing labor-intensive
goods, income inequality is predicted to increase. This effect might even be stronger, if the expansion of
exporting sectors puts a premium on high skills. The specialization into low-skilled-labor intensive goods, on
the other hand, should increase the income share of the lower tail of the income distribution in Developing
Economies. The comparative-advantage framework has been criticized, however, due to its inability to
explain the inequality effects of intra-industry trade as well as the observed increase in income inequality in
most middle- and low-income countries. Two strands of the literature are particularly relevant to fill these
gaps. First, theories that address the increasing importance of outsourcing and multinational enterprises
indicate that the required skill level of workers in industries that moved from high to low income countries is
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usually higher than the average in these economies. The resulting skill premium thus increases the dispersion
of wages. Second, trade liberalization provides incentives for innovation activities in exporting sectors and
facilitates technological diffusion via technologies embedded in imported capital goods (Acemoglu, 2003).
Skill premias emerge in high- and low-income countries due to trade with similar and industrialized economies
respectively.
In general, empirical studies are quite inconclusive. They suggest that the mechanisms through which
globalization affects inequality are country- and time-specific (UNCTAD, 2012). Results depend on countries’
technological development level, the nature of import/export dependency, and whether actual trade flows
or indicators of trade openness are examined (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). Jaumotte et al. (2013) find
trade liberalization and exports to reduce income inequality. Roser & Cuaresma (2014) provide evidence
supporting the implication of SST as they identify non-oil imports from less developed countries as a robust
driver of increasing income inequality in OECD countries. Also Meschi & Vivarelli (2009) highlight the
importance of decomposing trade flows depending on their origin and destination. They provide evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the acceleration of technological progress via trade increases skill premiums,
thereby inequality, particularly in middle income countries.
It has long been recognized that education has a pivotal equalizing role through its influence on labor
supply. Based on human capital theory (Becker, 1964), an extensive body of empirical research showed that
an additional year of schooling increases individual wages. Thus, increasing average educational attainment
should reduce income inequality. The direction and extent of this effect depends, however, on the distribution
of advancement across different education levels and on relative returns at these levels, i.e. on the composition
and the wage effect (Foerster & To´th, 2015). For a given level of educational attainment, a more equal
distribution of education reduces income inequality if returns to education are constant. If returns to
education are decreasing, the equalizing effect will be stronger. However, if returns to education are increasing
due to high skill premiums, the equalizing effect is diminished or might even be offset. Conversely, increasing
higher education might increase the degree of educational inequality but still reduce the skill premium,
thereby reducing inequality in the distribution of earnings.
An extensive body of research analyzed the dynamics of skill premiums, education and wage inequality
in high income countries, while research is relatively scarce for middle and low income countries. There,
the focus of education policy is to haul people out of poverty by increasing literacy and primary education.
These efforts might, however, be offset by technology and trade induced movements in the upper part of
the education distribution. In this vein, Carnoy (2011) argues that mass expansion of higher education is
able to contribute to increasing income inequality, depending on the return differential between university
education and lower levels; and on public education policy. In general, empirical evidence on the relation
between education, its distribution and income inequality is inconclusive. Studies that included some mea-
sure of average educational attainment as a control variable found either a negative (e.g. OECD, 2011) or
insignificant (e.g. Roser & Cuaresma, 2014) relation to income inequality. In a panel dataset covering a
broad sample of countries, Gregorio & Lee (2002) find higher average attainment and a lower variance of
education to significantly contribute to decreasing income inequality. On the contrary, Castello´-Climent &
Dome´nech (2014) observed that large reductions in education inequality (measured by an education Gini
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coefficient), which were mainly due to a drop in illiteracy in recent decades, have not been accompanied by
similar reductions in income inequality.
Labor supply and demand factors affect not only the personal distribution of income but also the func-
tional distribution between capital and labor. First, technology and trade induced reductions in low-skilled
incomes were not countervailed by an increase in the high-skilled income share. The average wage share thus
decreased since the 1980s in the majority of economies. Stockhammer (2013) argues that, additionally to
its skill-biasedness, technological change has become capital rather than labor augmenting. Second, trade
integration has been shown to increase the relative bargaining power of capital, being the more mobile factor
(Rodrik, 1997). Beyond that, over the last two decades financial liberalization lead to increasing shares of
capital incomes and top-managerial remunerations in economies (OECD, 2011, Checchi and Garcia-Pen˜alosa,
2010). These factors have weakened the position of labor relative to capital. As capital is held by, and capital
income accrues to a few, this contributes to increasing overall income inequality.
A wide range of theories from political science, law and economics, demonstrate the pervasive influence
of political institutions and governance on the distribution of income. The level of inequality in societies has
been shown to be the result of historical factors, such as colonization, and structural features, such as the
extent of social cohesion and ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Chakravorty, 2006; Angeles, 2007). Beyond that,
governments with long democratic traditions have implemented extensive civil rights and voting mechanisms
in order to reveal the preferences of everybody equally, while decisions in autocratic regimes are taken by and
thus benefit a small elite. The ideology of different political parties in democratic regimes in turn determines
the degree to which labor movements are supported and redistributive policies are implemented.1.
Labor market policies are implemented in order to achieve socially desirable redistributive goals and
mitigate market risks. Thus, among other things, collective bargaining, minimum wages and unemployment
benefits are generally shown to reduce the dispersion in labor incomes. There is, however, some evidence on
unintentional effects of such policies.2 Governments’ redistributive policies, reflected in the tax structure and
provisions as social security and public welfare benefits, determines the difference between the distribution
of market and personal disposable income. Education and health policies, on the other hand, alter the level
and distribution of human capital, thereby affecting market incomes in the long and disposable incomes in
the short run.3 By determining the relative quality of education institutions, the structure of education
spending also affects the distribution of returns to education (Carnoy, 2011). Chakravorty (2006) provides a
theoretical framework with implications for the relation between regime types and redistributive policies. He
describes governments that divert national resources towards personal gain as extractive (high inequality),
and delineates non-extractive regimes into those that redistribute mainly through short-term social security
and welfare benefits (low inequality), or invest in long-term social benefits such as education and health
(moderate inequality).
Ample evidence provides support for the vital role of redistribution via social security and transfers in
1See Huber et al. (2006) for a nice discussion of the relevance of political factors and an application to Latin American
countries
2Checchi & Penalosa (2010) found that labor market institutions indeed reduce income inequality but that this effect is
associated with higher unemployment rates. In contrast, Caldero´n et al. (2005) found that minimum wages, if set too high, can
reduce employment and increase inequality.
3This is especially true for health care and tertiary education policies which directly alter the costs of health services and
tertiary education respectively.
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western welfare states (OECD, 2011). However, results on the effects of social spending for a broader set of
countries and developing economies are scarce, mainly due to data restrictions. Huber et al. (2006) found
social security and welfare to have equalizing effects in Latin American and Caribbean countries if they
are governed by democratic regimes. Kemp-Benedict (2011) provides empirical support for Chakravorty’s
(2006) model in a broad sample of countries. Sylwester (2002) examines the effect of public education
expenditure on income inequality and finds greater investments to reduce income inequality in the long run,
and primarily in high income countries. Carnoy (2011), on the other hand, states that decreasing public
spending differences between higher and lower education levels and increasing spending differences between
elite and mass universities are able to contribute to increasing inequality not only in emerging economies
but also in high income countries.
3 Income Inequality Measures and Data Sources
We examine two conceptually divergent measures of inequality: the Gini coefficient, which is a comprehensive
measure of income differences across an entire population, but which masks the internal composition of the
distribution; and a ratio of extremes (lowest/highest decile income shares), which reveals the disparity
between the tails of the income distribution, but leaves out the rest. We seek the most inclusive measure of
income inequality at the individual level in countries. Thus, we seek measures of personal disposable income
calculated on a per capita basis, covering urban and rural regions, all forms of employment as well as males
and females. This restricts us to nationally representative household survey data assembled for a broad
panel of countries.
3.1 Data on Income Inequality
Income inequality datasets are notoriously diverse across countries in their underlying estimation methods,
measures, units of analysis, data sources and availability of panel data. One of the most widely used and
discussed panel dataset is that by Deininger & Squire (1996), who assembled surveys from across countries
that meet their desired standard of quality. These data have been shown to be internally inconsistent in
ways that are not easily reconcilable.4 Recent studies use World Bank’s POVCAL database for Developing
Countries (Chen & Ravallion, 2004). This dataset is, however, quite sparse and unbalanced. To overcome
data sparseness and concept diversity, many second-generation studies use parametric extrapolations to
calculate Gini indices for years with no survey data. A popular choice is the global Estimated Household
Income Inequality (EHII) dataset from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). It is based on the
Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset, but fills in missing data and adjusts for differing income concepts by
exploiting the relation between manufacturing pay and overall income (Galbraith & Kum, 2005). However,
labor in formal markets, let alone manufacturing, represents a small share of employment in poor, particularly
agrarian, countries. The estimated income Gini coefficients are thus limited in their ability to predict income
inequality in these economies.
Most recently, large meta-datasets which assemble income inequality measures from a variety of relatively
4See Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), Galbraith & Kum (2005) and Galbraith (2012).
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reliable source emerged. Instead of applying estimation techniques in order to correct for differences in
the underlying data, these databases make discrepancies explicit by reporting survey sources and income
concepts, among other things. The widely-used All the Ginis Dataset, constructed by Branko Milanovic,
takes this approach but does not provide information on decile or quintile income shares. We thus develop a
self-consistent data set that is derived from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version
3.0B, September 2014 (WIID V3.0B). WIID combines an updated (unpublished) version of the Deininger
and Squire dataset with unit data from a variety of other sources including the Luxembourg Income Study,
Transmonee by UNICEF, SEDLAC5, World Bank sources and household surveys from national statistical
offices, resulting in a total of 7,054 observations. While the data still originate from different sources, they are
transparent with respect to the income- and/or consumption definition, the statistical units to be adopted
and the use of equivalence scales and weighting. The extensive documentation provided with the database
enables one to extract data based on a chosen selection criteria and secure a minimum variation of the
underlying data.
3.2 Data Processing
We develop selection criteria to ensure that, as far as possible, sources are based on a consistent set of mea-
sures and assumptions. We thus only select sources with comprehensive population coverage by gender, age
and region. We require further consistency with respect to the underlying income concept, and construct per
capita-, rather than household-based, Gini indices. Finally, we require a minimum of three time observations
over one decade.6
The one insurmountable, albeit well-known, source of inconsistency in the dataset is the income concept
used across countries. While disposable income would be the ideal basis, many Asian countries report
consumption expenditure data. Many others only report gross income, which excludes taxes and transfers.
As we focus on within-country trends, we allow different concepts across countries but pick sources based
on an order of priority in the income measure they use and require consistency of the income concept over
time. As a result, we are able to use disposable-income-based Gini indices for most Advanced Economies
and Latin American countries, while for many Asian and most African countries we use consumption-based
measures.
One novelty in our study is to further refine our income inequality series to enforce source consistency
within countries at varying degrees. In the most restrictive case (SingleSource Gini), we select one source
per country that best meets our selection criteria with regards to time coverage, reliability and regional con-
sistency.7 In a second case (MultiSource Gini), we allow multiple sources for a country, but exclude sources
in two cases: sources have data for only a single year; and sources whose data are unreasonably inconsistent
for consecutive years with data from other sources. The importance of this restriction is illustrated in Table
1, which reveals inconsistencies in Ginis for Ghana and Sri Lanka even among World Bank sources.
5Social and Economic Database for Latin American Countries
6We dropped all “Quality 4” coded observations, and “Quality 3” coded observations pertaining to unclear and rare income
definitions.
7More often than not, we use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and Eurostat measures for Western European countries,
Transmonee (UNICEF) for countries in transition, the Social and Economic Database for Latin American Countries (SEDLAC)
for Latin American countries, and either individual country or World Bank sources (Deininger and Squire, or the Poverty
Monitoring Database) for Asian and African countries.
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Table 1: Income Gini Source Inconsistencies
Country Year WB1 WB2 WB3
Ghana 1997 32.7
Ghana 1998 50.7
Ghana 1999 40.7
Sri Lanka 2000 27
Sri Lanka 2002 40.2
WB1: World Bank Poverty Monitoring Database
2002; WB2: Deininger and Squire 2004;
WB3:World Development Indicators 2004. In each
case, WB1 provides the longer time series but
WB2 or WB3 appear only once. Source: WIID
V3.0B.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Income Inequality Series
Mean Sd Min Max Observations
MS Gini overall 35.13 10.19 18.00 66 Total 945
between 9.80 22.39 58.80 N 74
within 2.64 21.41 52.60
SSGini overall 36.57 10.78 19.10 66 Total 649
between 10.52 20.36 58.80 N 60
within 2.40 25.10 48.72
DecRatio overall 10.75 6.67 0.37 32.06 Total 691
between 5.87 0.70 22.09 N 71
within 2.15 4.34 20.99
Creating this internally consistent dataset reduces the size of available observations by an order of mag-
nitude, in our multi-source case resulting in an unbalanced panel with 945 observations from 74 countries,
including 50% from Advanced Economies. Data coverage is more sparse for Developing Economies, with
21%, 14%, 9% and 6% of total observations in Latin American, Central Asian and European, Asian, and
African countries, respectively (see Table 2). Our data set includes observations from 1960 to 2013, but only
4 percent of all observations are for before 1975. We thus truncate the dataset in 1975 in order to harmonize
th sample period across countries. The time period covered by the multi-source Gini ranges on average from
1980 to 2011 and from 1988 to 2006 in Advanced and Developing Economies, respectively. Strengthening
the requirements for data consistency further reduces the sample size. The average time period shrinks,
especially in Advanced Economies, now covering the time span from 1985 to 2004.8 Figures 3 and 4 in the
appendix plot the time series of both Gini indices by country in order to visualize the discrepancies w.r.t.
time and space.
WIID reports information on incomes by quintiles and deciles if available. We use this information in
order to compute a ratio of extremes, the share of income accruing to the bottom decile in relation to that
of the top decile of the income distribution (DecRatio). A higher value thus implies lower inequality at the
extremes. Even if we permit the inclusion of multiple sources, all requirements with respect to population,
regional and time coverage as well as the income concept also apply to the decile ratio.
8This implies that the crises period is captured in the multi-source case for the majority of countries, while it is not in the
single-source case.
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4 Covariates
4.1 Total Factor Productivity
We represent technological change as total factor productivity (TFP). Some similar studies use the share of
information and communication technology (ICT) in the capital stock (Jaumotte et al., 2013). We prefer
a broader productivity measure since our dataset includes poor countries that may benefit from a range
of technologies (e.g., assembly lines) other than ICT. The caveat of an economy-wide TFP is that the
indicator potentially includes the effect of other factors, such as institutional quality, that mediate between
technological change and output. However, the unobserved effect of institutions is pervasive in empirical
studies, and partly controlled for by including country-specific effects.
We use a conventional growth accounting framework to estimate TFP (Hall & Jones, 1999). The growth
rate of TFP is thus obtained as the unknown part in:
∆ ln yi,t = αit∆ ln kit + (1− αit)∆ lnhcit +∆ lnAit (1)
where ∆ ln yi,t is the growth rate of real GDP per worker (at constant 2005 prices, output approach) in
country i at time t. ∆ ln kit is the growth rate of physical capital per worker and αit and (1 − αit) are the
capital and labor shares respectively. All variables are obtained from the most recent version of Penn World
Tables (PWT8.0), which provides newly created figures of capital stocks as well as country and time specific
labor shares (see Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). However, in order to be consistent with our education variables,
we use the IIASA/VID data (see section 4.3) for computing human capital by worker (hcit) as follows
hcit = e
φ∗sit (2)
where sit are the mean years of schooling (see below) and φ is the average return to education. We continue
along the lines of Inklaar & Timmer (2013)9 in allowing for piecewise linear returns to education based
on Psacharopoulos (1994) From the resulting growth rates of TFP (∆ lnAit) we obtain the level of TFP
at constant national prices by setting 2005=1. We test the robustness of our TFP measure by conducting
sensitivities using a similar index based on the growth rate of TFP taken from the Conference Board Total
Economy Database (de Vries & Erumban, 2015).
4.2 Trade
We develop trade flow indicators that enable us to test the differential hypothesis regarding trade with
high- and low-income countries. We use the Correlates of War (COW v3.0) bilateral trade database to
generate import flows from only those countries whose exports are not predominantly natural resources
or certain plantation crops, and which therefore fall outside the scope of the SST’s ’competing’ products.
Following Isham et al. (2005), we categorize these flows into those from high-income and low-income countries,
as a proxy for high-skilled and low-skilled (manufacturing) imports respectively. In comparison, Meschi
9Thanks to the extensive documentation along with PWT8.0, we were able to access the stata do file for the calculation of
their tfp measure and adjusted this code in order to include the IIASA/VID education data.
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& Vivarelli (2009) disaggregate exports by source and destination, but do not exclude natural resource
trade. Roser & Cuaresma (2014) use a similar trade flow decomposition, but examine inequality in only
industrialized countries. Beyond that, we include the total level of exports in GDP in order to account for
distributional effects of wage and employment growth in exporting enterprises.
4.3 Education
Empirical works often represent education as an average attainment level (UNCTAD, 2012; Meschi and
Vivarelli, 2009; Bergh and Nilsson, 2010). Increases in average attainment might, however, stem from
increases within different segments of the education distribution, resulting in differing degrees of inequality
in education and affecting the corresponding returns to education differently (see Section 2). In order to
account for the distributional dimension of education, we include an education Gini coefficient and conduct
sensitivities with education represented as population shares for different attainment levels.
Following Sauer & Zagler (2014) and Sauer & KC (2012), we calculate the education Gini coefficient
measuring the degree of education inequality in the population older than 15 years as follows:
EducGini15+ =
1
MY S
4∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
|yi − yj | pipj (3)
where pi is the share of concerning population for which i is the highest level attained and yi is the
corresponding cumulative duration of formal schooling. MY S, the mean years of schooling in the population
aged 15 and over, is given byMY S =
∑n
i=1 pi ∗yi. As with the income Gini, the education Gini is a measure
of mean standardized deviations between all possible pairs of persons. Higher values reflect a less equal
distribution. An education Gini of zero means that the entire population attains the same education level,
regardless of which. An education Gini of one implies one person has tertiary, and the rest does not attain
any education.
In order to measure the aggregate level and the distribution of educational attainment, we use the de-
mographic dataset from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and the Vienna Institute
of Demography (IIASA/VID) (KC et al., 2010; Lutz & KC, 2011). This dataset consists of multistage back
and forward population projections for 175 countries by five-year age groups, sex and level of educational
attainment, spanning the period from 1960 to 2010. Moreover, the dataset gives the full attainment distri-
butions for four education categories: (1) no formal, (2) primary, (3) secondary and (4) tertiary education.
These are based on UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories, and
are thus strictly consistent over time and across countries. From these data we derive the population attain-
ment levels, pi. Finally, we obtain country- and year-specific information on the time it takes to reach each
education level, yi, from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS).
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As we discuss in Section 5.2, the strong decline in the share of people without formal education is the
predominant driver of decreasing education inequality in Developing Countries. In Advanced Economies,
on the other hand, almost universal literacy and schooling has been achieved in the eighties. The effects
10Since the IIASA/VID dataset includes in each one of the four broad categories of educational attainment individuals who
did not complete the respective level, using the total duration for completion would overestimate the years that a representative
individual spent in school. We therefore follow the approach proposed by KC et al. (2010) in order to account for uncompleted
attainment levels when computing the mean duration of each education level.
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of these regional differences in the education distribution have as yet not been explored separately in the
context of income inequality. We fill this gap by decomposing the education Gini11 of the total population,
EducGini15+, into the share of unschooled people, (p
1
15+), and an education Gini for those with at least
some formal education (categories 2-4), EducGiniE15+. Moreover, we analyze the separate effects of primary,
secondary and tertiary attainment in order to provide a full picture of the relation between education and
income inequality.
4.4 Labor vs. Capital Income
In order to account for the effects of changes in the distribution between capital and labor which go beyond
factors captured by the other covariates, we control for the share of labor income. We use data from PWT 8.0,
which for the first time provide labor shares varying over time. Data are limited to after 1980 for Advanced
Economies and after 1990 for Developing Economies. Hence, we expect our results to underestimate the
influence of the labor share.
4.5 Governance
We select four measures in order to capture the redistributive capacity of governments. First, we account
for the relative weight of public social spending categories by using data on the shares of education, health
and social protection expenditures in total spending from the Statistics of Public Expenditure for Economic
Development (SPEED) database of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). We also con-
duct robustness tests accounting for the sum of public social spending relative to GDP, taken from the
same database. Second, the propensity of governments to carry out redistributive policies is proxied by the
political orientation of the chief executive’s party. This measure is taken from the World Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions (DPI) and is represented by an increasing score from 1 to 3, indicating right, center and
left, respectively. The political ideology of the chief executive’s party determines the structure and extend,
not only of public social provisions, but also of taxation and labor market policies. As we do not control for
them separately, we expect the inequality effects of the latter factors to be accommodated by the political
orientation variable.
5 Descriptive Trends - Income and Education Inequality
5.1 Income Distribution Trends
Scholars have increasingly been interested in the general rise in inequality since the eighties. More recently,
economists started to analyze the role the substantial increase in income inequality has played in the approach
of the financial crises. Galbraith (2012) shows that inequality has been increasing since 1987 in low- and
middle income non-OECD countries and since 1980 in OECD countries. When grouped by region12 (see Table
11Morrisson & Murtin (2013) formally show that the positive relation between the education Gini and the share of people
with no formal education is mechanical rather than behavioral. Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech (2014) derive a decomposition
of the education Gini coefficient into the share of illiterates and the education Gini coefficient among the literates.
12We categorize countries into regions using the World Bank definition: AdvEcon (Advanced Economies), CAEE (Central
Asia & Eastern Europe), LAC (Latin America & Carribean), EAP (Eastern Asia & the Pacific), SA (South Asia), MENA
(Middle East & North Africa, SSA (Sub Saharan Africa).
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Table 3: Income Inequality Trends within Countries by Region
Mean Sd Time Trenda (> 1975)
Region IncGinib DecRatio IncGini DecRatio IncGini DecRatio
AdvEcon 28.10 0.20 2.23 0.03 ⇑ ⇓
CAEE 34.02 0.11 3.01 0.01 None None
LAC 50.86 0.03 2.44 0.01 ⇓ ⇑
EAP 36.79 0.10 4.01 0.01 ⇑ None
SA 31.42 0.15 2.18 0.02 None None
MENA 38.78 0.09 1.37 0.02 ⇑ ⇓
SSA 42.05 0.07 4.45 0.02 None None
aStatistically significant time trend (t-stat ≥ 2) from a fixed effects regression of inequality against time.
bMulitSource Gini
3), we find the multi-source Gini and the decile ratio to reveal that inequality has been rising in Advanced
Economies as well as in the Middle East and North Africa. Only in Latin America, the Gini has been
declining on average while the share of income accruing to the bottom 10% increased since 1975. However,
Latin American countries report the highest average level of inequality. One explanation for this regional
difference is that the poorest deciles are benefiting from income gains to a greater extent in Latin America
than in other regions. This may be in part due to favorable redistributive policies of recent governments in
Latin America (Lustig et al., 2013).
At a country level, however, trends in income equality vary over time, and across regions. In both
Advanced and Developing economies, many countries (e.g. US, UK, Poland, Bangladesh, China) have
experienced steadily rising, while others (e.g. Slovenia, Brazil) have experienced falling inequality. Many
countries have experienced reversals in trends, which more often than not took the form of a rise in the
eighties into the nineties, followed by a recent decrease either in the nineties or 2000s (e.g. Sweden, Chile,
Venezuela, Thailand).
There are other noteworthy patterns in regional income inequality trends. The within-country standard
deviations of Ginis are very similar across regions, suggesting that universally income distribution changes
are slow at any level of inequality (see also Table 2), and that the extent of influence of time-varying drivers
is narrowly bounded. Moreover, the Decile Ratio is highly (inversely) correlated to the Gini, but the extent
varies by region. A simple regression reveals that globally the Decile Ratio explains about 75 percent of
the variation in the income Gini within countries.13 This share is higher in Advanced Economies and Asia,
where the Decile Ratio is also more volatile. This suggests that, to a large extend, changes in the overall
income distribution are consistent with changes at the extremes.
5.2 Education Distribution Trends
In contrast to the general increasing trend of income inequality, we observe a global trend towards a more
equal distribution of education. This finding is consistent with previous evidence pointing to the puzzle
(Castello´-Climent & Dome´nech, 2014) that a universal declining trend of education inequality has not been
13Within R2 of 75.4 in a fixed effects OLS of Gini regressed on DecileRatio for the full sample. Other studies (cited in
UNCTAD, 2012) find even stronger dependence of the Gini on income concentration: in the US, the income concentration
change in just the top 1 percent explains from half to almost the entire change in the country Gini.
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accompanied by reductions in income inequality. However, while the education Gini for the total population,
(EducGini15+) decreased strongly, the education Gini of the educated population (EducGini
E
15+) declined
marginally (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Education Gini Coefficients
The strong decrease in the education Gini of the total population, especially in Developing Economies,
can in large part be attributed to a significant reduction in the share of people who did not attain any
formal education. The concerning variable is thus 97 percent correlated with the overall education Gini,
EducGini15+. In regions with a relatively high number of unschooled people in 1975 (see Figure 2), the
trends in education inequality measures differ substantially. The reduction in the respective population share
was most modest in the highest inequality regions, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, primary
schooling does not necessarily increase if simultaneous movements to secondary attainment dominate. In
Advanced Economies as well as Central Asia and Europe14, both education inequality measures move almost
simultaneously as the share of unschooled people is already very low since the eighties (see section 5). Notably,
changes in the degree of education inequality within the educated population have been driven by changes at
the extremes in Advanced Economies. The share of the population with secondary attainment has remained
relatively constant at 60% since 1990, while the share with primary (tertiary) decreased (increased) more
dramatically (i.e. 5 percentage points each between 1990 and 2000).
14These include all European countries which are not categorized as Advanced Economies.
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Figure 2: Education Population Shares
6 Estimation Method
Given our primary interest is to examine within-country time trends, a fixed-effect (FE) least squares model
would seem appropriate, and has been used in other related works (UNCTAD, 2012; Galbraith and Kum,
2005). However, due to the presence of error disturbances, as described further below, we prefer a feasible
GLS (FGLS) estimator combined with country fixed effects. A similar approach has been used by Kemp-
Benedict (2011), but with regional fixed effects .
Unlike a pooled regression, a FE model would prevent omitted variable bias related to country-specific
time-invariant factors that distinguish country’s historical levels of inequality. However, we observe first or-
der autocorrelation (AR1) and groupwise (i.e.country-wise) heteroskedasticity in the errors.15 The observed
complex structure of error disturbances makes a basic FE model unsuitable for drawing inferences on statis-
tical significance. Both types of disturbances are likely, as the Gini is a persistent, path-dependent variable.
Moreover, as some countries have more erratic Ginis than others, it is natural to expect the error variances
to vary by country. Notably, with the exception of studies that use dynamic panel models, many empirical
works of income inequality, including those that use FE models, do not report tests of error disturbances.
A typical approach to correct for autocorrelation while accounting for individual effects is to include the
lagged dependent variable and use the system GMM estimator. The lagged dependent variable eliminates
AR(1), and the use of lags as instruments accounts for the induced endogeneity, i.e. dynamic panel bias.
15For groupwise heteroskedasticity, we calculate a modified Wald Statistics using the STATA command xttest3 in a fixed
effect model. The test results strongly rejects the null that the country-wise variances in standard errors are equal in each
specification. In order to test for AR(1), we use the test by Woolridge, which is discussed and analyzed in Drukker (2003)
and implemented in STATA using the command xtserial. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation (based on the coefficient
of a regression of lagged residuals) is strongly rejected in each of our model specifications at the global and regional level.
Furthermore, the FGLS model calculates the common AR(1) coefficient to be 0.4 or higher in all the model runs.
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However, system GMM is asymptotically efficient only for very large N. Furthermore, the need to generate
instruments from multiple lags reduces the degrees of freedom significantly. The least squares dummy
variable bias correction approach in dynamic models is an alternative to system GMM (Meschi & Vivarelli,
2009), but offers no straightforward way to deal with groupwise heteroskedasticity (Bruno, 2005).
Estimation methods that correct for complex error structures include FGLS or clustered standard errors in
FE models. We select FGLS based on its finite sample efficiency properties and the particular error structure
present in our data. In samples as ours, with N > T, that exhibit groupwise heteroskedasticity, FGLS is
likely to be more efficient than OLS (Reed & Ye, 2011).16 Moreover, although cluster robust standard errors
can correct for serial correlation within panels, and can be weighted on groupwise heteroskedasticity, they
can be less reliable than ordinary standard errors with unbalanced clusters (Ke´zdi, 2004).
To sum up, we apply a FGLS estimator combined with unobserved country fixed effects in order to
estimate the long-term, global and broad regional effects of income-inequality drivers within countries. Our
model specification is thus given by Equation (4):
IGinit = β1TFPt−1 + β3Tt−1 + β4Et−1 + β5Lt−1 + β5Pt−1 + γY ear + αi + ǫi,t (4)
with
T = [Imphigh, Implow, Exp]
E = [MY S15+;EducGini15+; p
1
15+, EducGini
E
15+; p
2
15+, p
3
15+, p
4
15+]
P = [PO,PSEduc, PSHealth, PSSP ]
where IGinit represents one of our three income inequality measures. Total factor productivity (TFP)
proxies for technological progress, trade matrix, T, consists of the two import vectors from high (ImpHigh)
and low (ImpLow) income countries and total exports (Exp). L is the labor income share. From the education
matrix, E, either mean years of schooling (MY S15+), the education Gini coefficient (EducGini15+), the
education Gini coefficient for the educated population (EducGiniE15+) and the unschooled population share
(p115+) or the remaining three population shares of primary, secondary and tertiary attainment enter the
model specification. In our governance specifications we add the matrix of political factors, P, which includes
the political orientation of the chief executive’s party (PO) and the three types public social spending. αi is
the country specific intercept and ǫi,t is the time varying error. We include all variables lagged one period
in order to account for reverse causality. Using Fisher-type unit-root tests we find some17 indication for our
income inequality measures to be trend-stationary in Dickey-Fuller specifications which account for AR(1).
This is also true for TFP and the labor income share. The population share with tertiary attainment and
imports from low income countries, on the other hand, follow a unit root process. For tackling the issue of
stationary, at least with respect to the dependent variables, TFP and the labor share, we include a time
16In particular, we implement FGLS using xtgls with the options corr(ar1) and panel(hetero). Reed and Ye (2009) demonstrate
(in balanced panels) that this method produces more efficient estimates than OLS in finite samples with N > T.
17Depending on the mothod for combining country-wise p-values, four test statistics can be computed, differing with respect to
their asymptotic behavior. While the inverse chi-squared statistic and its modification indicate that the multi- and single-source
Gini are stationary, the inverse- normal and inverse logit t statisitc indicate trend-stationarity.
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trend (Y ear).
7 Results and Discussion
Tables 4 to 9 report the main results of our analysis. We provide results for each of three income inequality
measures (see Sections 3.2 and 5.1) and education variables (see Sections 4.3 and 5.2). Moreover, we present
our findings separately for the global level, for Advanced and for Developing Economies as well as excluding
(Tables 4 to 6) and including (Tables 7 to 9) political factors as doing so reduces the number of countries
and time periods. In order to provide some sense of the relative impact magnitude of multiple income
inequality drivers, we report summary statistics for each variable in the Appendix and interpret the effects
as percentage contribution to the within standard deviation of the concerning inequality measure in the
relevant region.
7.1 Total Factor Productivity
In general, we find a tendency of technological progress, measured by TFP, to increase inequality in the
distribution of income within countries. However, the relationship strongly varies depending on the inequality
measures used, the observed region and whether political factors are accounted for. At a global level, we
find indication that accelerating technological progress increases inequality w.r.t. the Gini coefficient as
well as the ratio of extremes in our basic specification. For the income Gini coefficients, the relationship
becomes more significant in the governance specification, with the magnitude being generally bigger for the
multi-source Gini. A large part of this effect stems from the sizable impact in Developing Economies where
the estimator ranges around 10, implying that an increase of TFP by one unit equal to 0.1 contributes
approximately 35% to the within variation of the multi-source Gini.
In Advanced Economies, in contrast, an increase in TFP by 0.1 accounts for roughly 34% to the within
variation of the single-source Gini. Truncating the sample in 2005 shows TFP to signficantly affect also the
multi-source Gini, indicating distortions due to the inclusion of the crises period in the latter case. TFP
becomes less relevant if we account for the distributional dimension of education and political factors. The
most robust result w.r.t. its impact in an education distribution specification is its relation to the decile ratio:
an increase of 0.1 decreases the relative share of incomes accruing to the bottom decile by 0.59, i.e. 18% of
the respective within variation. The discrepancies between our basic and the governance specifications can
be due to the shrinking sample size w.r.t. time and space. Restricting the basic model to the governence
sample size reveals, however, that the inclusion of political factors does reduce the influence of TFP on
income inequality.18
7.2 Trade
The decomposition of imports provides region specific insights into the inequality effects related to trade.
We find imports from low-income countries to have an equalizing effect in Advanced Economies. If political
factors are accounted for, this impact is larger and visible for all three inequality measures. Moreover, it is
18These results are available from the authors upon request.
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generally higher for the single-source than for the multi-source Gini, fluctuating around 0.13 in the latter
case. Thus, an increase in the share of imports from low-income countries in GDP by one percentage point
accounts for roughly 6% to the within variation of the multi-source Gini. Our evidence thus contradicts the
implication of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that imports from low-income countries compete with goods
produced in low-skilled sectors of high-income countries, thereby increasing income inequality.
In Developing Economies, the effect of trade with other low-income countries is much larger but only
significant in the multi-source case where the impact ranges from 11% to 14%, controlling for political factors.
On the contrary, trade with high-income countries significantly increases income inequality, contributing
by about 3% to the within variation of the multi-source Gini. Beyond that, importing goods from high-
income countries also slightly affects single-source Gini and the extremes of the income distribution. Trade
between high-income countries, on the other hand, significantly increases income inequality only in our basic
specification.
Our results indicate the positive distributional impacts of wage and employment growth in exporting
enterprises, captured by the share of total exports in GDP, to be only relevant for the income distribution in
the parsimonious specification for Advanced Economies. This might be due to the interference of disequal-
izing effects of skill premiums simultaneously emerging in relevant industries. In Developing Economies, on
the other hand, the inequality effects of exporting to other low and middle or to high income countries have
been shown to work in opposite directions and are thus able to confound each other.
In general, our findings provide indication that factors not captured in the theoretical framework of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model affect the relation between trade in goods and services and income inequality in
Advanced as well as in Developing Economies. Trade between similar economies turns out to be relevant
for the income distribution. Moreover, even after controlling for TFP, we find the technology embedded in
imports from high-income countries to significantly contribute to increasing income inequality, especially in
the developing world.
7.3 Education
We capture the distributional dimension of education using three methods: the overall education Gini
coefficient, the decomposition into the share of unschooled people and the Gini coefficient of the educated
population and the population shares with each education level separately. In order to compare our results
to the existing literature, the first three columns of each table report estimates on the inequality effects of
average educational attainment, measured by mean years of schooling. In our most parsimonious models,
average attainment matters marginally for income inequality, slightly affecting the decile ratio globally and
in Developing Economies. While accounting for political factors substantially increases the significance of
the equalizing effect of mean years of schooling at a global level as well as for Advanced Economies, the
impact on the ratio of extremes disappears for Developing Economies.
Exploring the distributional dimension of educational attainment provides a more nuanced picture of
the relation between education and inequality. Reducing educational inequality, measured by the overall
education Gini coefficient, significantly contributes to decreasing income inequality in Advanced Economies.
This effect penetrates to the global level, is true for the two income Gini coefficients as well as the decile
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ratio, and becomes larger as political factors are accounted for: based on column 5 of Table 8, a reduction in
the education Gini coefficient by one point decreases the multi-source Gini by 0.4 points and increases the
decile ratio by one percentage point, thereby contributing for 18% and 35% to the within variation of the
concerning variables respectively.
For Developing Economies the education effect w.r.t. the overall education Gini coefficient vanishes if
we account for political factors. However, the predominant driver of decreasing education inequality is the
strong decline in the share of people without formal education (see section 5.2). The inequality relevance of
this observation is supported by the decomposition into the share of unschooled people and the education
Gini coefficient for the educated population. Decreasing the respective population share by one percentage
point increases the relative income share of the bottom decile by 0.16 percentage points, i.e. 13% of the
within variation, in the governance specification. With a magnitude of 0.7 points, this effect is even larger in
Advanced Economies. The extend of the reduction in the unschooled population share was, however, much
larger in Developing Economies (see Figure 2).
In Advanced Economies, the distribution of education among the educated population does not deviate
much from the overall distribution, its relation to income inequality is thus similar. In contrast, the slight
decrease in the degree of educational inequality among the educated population has contributed to decrease
the relative share of income accruing to the bottom decile in Developing Economies. This effect is reflected in
the negative impact of primary and tertiary education population shares on the ratio of extremes, implying
that the slight decrease in primary education, observed in Central and Eastern Asia as well as in Latin
America, the Middle East and North Africa had an equalizing effect at the extremes while the respective
increase in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa contributed to worsen the relative position of the bottom
decile (see Figure 2. In each case the impact magnitude is 14% of the within variation. Both situations imply
a dominance of the wage effect, intensifying and relaxing the pressure on low-skilled wages in the latter and
former situation respectively. The inequality increasing effect of tertiary education attainment, on the other
hand, is much larger as it contributes 36% to the within variation of the decile ratio. This outcome might
result from the composition effect, i.e. an increase in educational inequality induced by higher education
levels, from excess demand or from increasing segmentation between mass and elite universities.
In Advanced Economies, increasing the population shares in any education category significantly con-
tributes to decreasing income inequality. The effect is strongest for tertiary education attainment where an
increase by one percentage point accounts for 14% as compared to 11% for secondary and 6% for primary
attainment of the within variation in the multi-source Gini. Interestingly, higher education is not only rele-
vant for the overall distribution but also for the extremes in Advanced Economies, revealing the importance
of the wage effect at this stage of educational development.
The fit of our model, given by the correlation between the dependent variable and its prediction, is neither
heavily affected by switching from the mean years of schooling to the overall education Gini specification,
nor by moving to models which include single elements the education distribution. At this stage it is thus
not straightforward to discriminate between the two aggregate measures of educational attainment. But the
importance of accounting for heterogeneity in the education-inequality relation is revealed by differential
regional results. In Advanced Economies, the coefficients of all elements in columns (7) to (12) point into
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the same, inequality decreasing, direction. We thus find a similarly strong relation between the aggregate
measures and income inequality. In Developing Economies, on the other hand, the estimates of the effects
of separate categories point into different directions, this precludes finding a significant relation between
aggregate measures and income inequality.
7.4 Governance
Our evidence suggests the most significant redistributive effects of governments to work through health
policies. Globally and in both regions as well as across almost all education specifications and income
inequality measures, increasing the share of public spending on health significantly contributes to reducing
income inequality. However, the magnitudes are quite small as it does not explain more than 4% and 5% of
the within variation of the income Gini coefficients and the decile ratio respectively.
In contrast, increasing the relative weight of social protection expenditures does not turn out to have
any distributional impacts. This result might be due to the dominance of social security spending in this
category.19 Social security is tied to labor market participation, thus population coverage is smaller the larger
informal markets, and exerts regressive effects if pay offs are strongly income dependent and contributions
are capped. Especially in Developing Economies, such conditions are able to countervail the equalizing effects
of direct income transfers.
Public education spending would be expected to increase the average level of education if it enables
more people to study but its effects on the education distribution depend on where it is targeted. It also
affects the quality of educational institutions if resources per student increase. If quality related means are
allocated unequally among institutions, even within primary, secondary or tertiary education levels, public
education policy exerts disequalizing effects on the returns to education, thus income inequality increases.
Our results indicate such conditions to prevail in Advanced Economies where, after controlling for the strong
equalizing effect of the quantitative dimension of educational attainment, increasing the relative weight of
public education spending increases income inequality generally and at the extremes. Even if the magnitude
is small, not contributing more than 7% and 9% to the within variation of the income Ginis and the decile
ratio respectively, it exceeds the equalizing effects of public spending on health. In Developing Economies,
on the other hand, we do not find any education policy effects which go beyond the impact on the quantity
of educational attainment.
Accounting for the political orientation of the chief executive’s party reduces the sample size for Devel-
oping Economies substantially. The fit of the model, measured by the correlation between the actual and
the predicted value of the dependent variable, is thus impaired. Nevertheless, the propensity of governments
to carry out redistributive policies is significantly relevant for the extremes of the income distribution in
Developing Economies. A shift from a right or central to a left government increases the relative income
share of the bottom decile by 0.4 and 0.2 percentage points respectively, accounting for 20% of the concerning
within variation. To some extend, this impact is indirect as it captures the inequality effects of redistributive
policies we are not accounting for.
19The main underlying sources of the SPEED database are the IMF Government Financial Statistics Yearbook and IMF
Statistical Annexes. Huber et al. (2006) note that more than 80 percent of expenditures in the social protection category goes
to social security.
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7.5 Labor Income Share & Time Trend
Our basic specification reveals a decline in the labor income share to significantly contribute to increasing
income inequality w.r.t. all measures globally and in Developing Economies. This effect entirely changes
as political factors are controlled for in Developing Economies. In Advanced Economies, in contrast, the
functional income distribution is more relevant after accounting for redistributive policies. This is especially
true for the single-source Gini and the ratio of extremes. In these cases, a decline in the labor share by one
percentage point accounts for almost one half and at most 83% of the respective within variation. We thus
find support for the hypothesis that changing power relations between capital and labor which go beyond
the market forces and political conditions we are accounting for are highly relevant also for the personal
income distribution in Advanced Economies.
Further evidence for the importance of inequality increasing conditions we are not capturing in our model
for Advanced Economies is provided by the significantly positive time trend. This may proxy for factors
such as the increasing role of financial capital and neoliberal policies of changing tax structures and labor
market liberalization, among other things, as they are extensively discussed for the US in Stiglitz (2012), and
have in general contributed to strengthen the relative position of capital owners and top-income earners. In
the governance specifications, the single- and multi-source Gini coefficients increased by roughly 0.2 points
a year while the relative share of income accruing to the bottom decile decreased by 0.3 percentage points.
This accounts for about 7% and 15% of the concerning within variations respectively.
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7.6 Robustness
We assessed the robustness of our findings w.r.t. income inequality measures and regional heterogeneity.
All explanatory variables exhibit some differences in magnitude and significance with different income Gini
indices as dependent variable. Discriminating between the single- and multi-source Gini implies a trade-off
between volatility that confounds pattern discernment and increasing sample size. For Advanced Economies,
we find a tendency of the single-source Gini to yield more frequent occurrences of variable significance as
the recent crises period is included in the multi-source Gini series. For Developing Economies, on the other
hand, the relatively large sample size of the multi-source Gini produces more significant results as compared
to the single-source series. In most cases, the significance and signs are consistent for the decile ratio and
Gini indices. Discrepancies are largely due to inequality drivers affecting the overall income distribution
differently than its tails.
From the regional sensitivities we learn that the influence of income inequality determinants varies signif-
icantly between Advanced and Developing Economies. On the one hand, global results are based on a larger
sample size and can thus be considered as more reliable. On the other hand, they show the average effect
across regions. Drawing inferences from only a global analysis would thus give false confidence in a claim,
e.g., that increasing population shares of educational attainment has served to reduce income inequality in
Developing Economies.
Beyond the tests already included in our main results, we addressed robustness by varying the sample
size and TFP measure, modeling political governance differently and by accounting for the importance of
international capital flows. These results are available from the authors upon request. As the inclusion of
the political orientation of the chief executive’s party reduces the sample size, we estimated all specifications
excluding the concerning variable without any effects on our main results. Besides analyzing the heterogeneity
in public social spending, we added for the sum of public health, education and social protection expenditures
in GDP. Doing so reveals a positive relation between public social spending and the single-source Gini in
Advanced Economies which is probably driven by the inequality increasing effect of education spending.
Interacting the sum of public spending with the political orientation variable provides some evidence that
this positive relation is strongest if a right party is in office and decreases in magnitude when changing to
center and left parties. Consistent with the inequality reducing effect of health spending, we find public
social spending to reduce income inequality in Developing Economies. Except of the overall education
Gini coefficient being significant in these specifications for Developing Economies, remaining results are
unchanged.
We also account for international capital flows by adding foreign direct investment (FDI) in flows in GDP,
taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Interestingly, while FDI itself is neither significant
in Advanced, nor in Developing Economies, imports from other high-income countries and total exports
significantly increase and decrease income inequality w.r.t. the single-source Gini in Advanced Economies
respectively. In general, using conference board TFP data does not affect our main results even if the sample
period is reduced to range from 1990 to 2010. Finally, our sensitivities truncating the sample size in 2005
reveal fluctuations due to the crises period to affect our results in the basic specification, turning TFP to be
significant also w.r.t. the multi-source Gini. In contrast, the results in the governance specification are not
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similarly affected.
8 Conclusions and Further Research
The novelty of this study has been in the design and choice of indicators of income inequality and its drivers.
We aimed at providing a comprehensive picture of global and broad regional drivers interacting to influence
within-country income inequality.
Our findings indicate the main factors adding to increasing inequality globally to be technological progress
and trade with high-income countries. Trade with low-income countries, public spending on health and
decreasing shares of people without any formal education, on the other hand, had significant equalizing
effects on the income distribution. The estimated effects of other income inequality drivers are highly region
specific. In Advanced Economies, the general decline in the share of labor incomes and increasing public
education spending added to increase income inequality, while reducing the degree of education inequality and
increasing educational attainment had substantial equalizing effects. In contrast, in Developing Economies,
the role of education is not equally clear as we find increasing population shares with primary and tertiary
education to have disequalizing effects. Analyzing the decile ratio in addition to the Gini coefficient as
dependent variable provided supplementary insights into the region-specific linkages between drivers and
inequality. The examination of multiple and internally consistent measures of inequality thus reveals the
challenge in drawing robust inferences on systematic global patterns of influence using large-N studies.
Even if we provided evidence on the heterogeneity of inequality determinants across space, the division
between Advanced and Developing Economies is quite rough and leaves an investigation of differential
regional splittings an important issue for further research.
In summary, our results provide evidence supporting the hypothesis of skill-bias being induced by tech-
nological progress and trade with high-income countries; but the strong equalizing role of increasing the skill
level of labor supply by increasing years of schooling and providing for a more equal distribution of education
is only present in Advanced Economies. This effect is, however, partly offset by increasing quality differen-
tials induced by public education spending. Political governance thus has important (dis)equalizing effects
on the income distribution. Moreover, changing power relations between capital and labor which go beyond
the factors we are accounting for are relevant for the personal income distribution. Although we examined
multiple drivers, there are still factors which we were not able to capture in our model. Data limitations
are especially stringent with respect to political factors in Developing Economies where national indicators
of public sector redistribution and labor market institutions lack in coverage across time and space. Also
the causes and effects of variations at the top of the income ladder, such as capital incomes and executive
compensation, are only accounted for insofar they affect the labor income share. A thoroughly examination
of the direct and indirect inequality effects of fiscal policies and regulations in western welfare states as well
as Developing Economies is thus a highly relevant for understanding income inequality but probably goes
beyond the scope of large panel studies in their ability to infer causal effects.
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A Income Gini Time Series
Figure 3: MultiSource Gini vs. SingleSource Gini Advanced Economies
32
Figure 4: MultiSource Gini vs. SingleSource Gini Developing Economies
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B Summary Statistics and Trends by Region
Table B.1: Summary Statistics by Region
Advanced Economies Developing Economies
Variable Mean Within sd Trend Mean Within sd Trend
MSGini 28.09 2.23 ⇑ 42.18 2.99 ⇑
SSGini 28.39 2.03 ⇑ 42.90 2.65 None
DecRatio 15.61 2.88 ⇓ 6.50 1.21 None
TFP 0.94 0.07 ⇑ 0.95 0.10 ⇓
Imphigh 25.71 5.62 ⇑ 20.26 7.82 ⇑
Implow 4.14 2.29 ⇓ 6.04 3.84 ⇑
Exp 30.05 5.89 ⇑ 26.80 7.32 ⇑
FDI 4.29 13.59 ⇑ 3.40 2.85 ⇑
L 61.32 2.81 ⇓ 50.52 3.70 ⇑
PSEduc 10.28 2.43 ⇑ 13.39 3.14 ⇑
PSHealth 12.07 2.56 ⇑ 6.56 3.47 ⇑
PSSP 35.19 4.21 ⇑ 11.48 4.75 ⇑
MY S15+ 12.13 0.63 ⇑ 8.50 0.61 ⇑
EducGini15+ 12.76 2.20 ⇓ 27.72 3.18 ⇓
EducGiniE15+ 10.70 1.28 ⇓ 18.01 1.24 ⇓
p115+ 2.39 1.34 ⇓ 12.79 3.06 ⇓
p215+ 18.69 4.50 ⇓ 35.07 2.69 ⇓
p315+ 59.53 3.26 ⇑ 35.07 2.69 ⇑
p415+ 19.41 3.09 ⇑ 11.96 1.54 ⇑
MinW/MdW 35.37 12.60 ⇓ 30.86 16.87 None
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